THE push into Afghanistan’s lethal bandit country – Helmand Province – by British forces was done without enough planning or equipment and under pressure from Nato, senior officers have said.
A damning new report by MPs has condemned the lack of troops, armoured vehicles and helicopters available to support Britain’s mission in 2006.
Yet even as commanders struggle to beat the Taliban without the resources they badly need, still more troop cuts are to be announced.
The Ministry of Defence will reveal tomorrow that 17,000 more posts are to be slashed over the next nine years, reducing the regular Army to its smallest size since Victorian times.
Current Army strength of 101,000 regulars is to be cut to 84,000 by 2020. At the same time, a £1.5billion programme to boost Britain’s reserve forces, including the Territorial Army, the Royal Air Force Volunteers Reserve and the Royal Naval Reserve, is also to be unveiled.
The report on Helmand Province reveals commanders were criticised for not anticipating that a push south would “stir up a hornets’ nest”, while mixed messages between military and government left Defence Secretary Dr Ian Reid believing there were enough resources.
The original plan was for a maximum of 3,150 British troops to be deployed for just three years. Today Britain has nearly 11,000 troops committed to the country, with a conditional pullout date of 2015.
The decision to deploy south into Helmand was taken on the back of a “moribund” Nato campaign that had achieved limited success in the north and west, MPs were told.
Gen Sir Robert Fry, former deputy to the Chief of Defence Staff, said: “If Nato ran out of fuel (political will) after half a mission, and the easiest, most benign half of the mission, question marks would be placed against its efficacy and its future role.”
Had Britain not gone into Helmand, there was a chance that Nato would never have gone into the south, with untold consequences to the alliance, he said.
He added: “We would have created the very ungoverned place that we went there to deny.” The move was ill-planned, supported with little intelligence and failed to anticipate the level of opposition troops would encounter, however.
Although efforts were made to delay the deployment, they were scuppered by pressure from Nato.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup said: “I can recall discussions that essentially went along the lines of ‘We don’t know much about the south but we know that it’s not the north.’ It’s real bandit country. I personally said, ‘We need to call a halt in our planning.’ We did halt for a time but then concerns grew within Nato. We were asked to step forward again, which we did.”
Brigadier Ed Butler, former head of British forces, Afghanistan, said the strength of the Taliban had been surprising.
He said: “There was an assumption that we were going to deploy the Force into a permissive environment…we would go out and start engaging with the people. As soon as we arrived, of course, they wanted to engage us.” That was because the Taliban, opiate dealers and warlords, felt their existence was being threatened.
Matters were made worse by some 200,000 casual labourers from Pakistan who stayed on as guns for hire and the Army’s failure to adapt to IEDs quickly.
Britain was expected to hold Helmand with just 3,000 men. Now there are more than 30,000 coalition troops in the region, the report by the House of Commons Defence Committee said.
The envelope was soon being pushed to the bloody quagmires of Sangin, Musa Qala and Now Zad, as part of “game changing” decisions which should have been put to Ministers, the committee said.
More worrying, warnings of equipment shortages were ignored or did not fall on the right ears. They needed more air support – Chinook and attack helicopters as well as transport aircraft. Brigadier Butler said: “We had something in the order of a 45 per cent shortfall of vehicles.”
This contrasted with Dr Reid, who in March 2006 reported: “I am reliably informed that the commander of the helicopter force is content with the number of flying hours available to him.”
James Arbuthnot, Commons Defence Committee chairman, said: “Our forces have achieved the best tactical outcomes possible in very difficult circumstances but the force levels deployed were never going to achieve what was being demanded by the UK, Nato and Afghan government.”